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PREFACE
Marketing agencies which operate in international
markets are faced with pricing and promotion decisions in
individual markets. Economic theory can assist in these
tasks by providing a framework for evaluating specific
commercial strategies in particular products.
Therefore, the Agricultural Economics Research Unit
has an interest in theoretical research which widens our
understanding of optimal decision-making by agencies
operating in agricultural markets.
Mrs S.K. Martin has been considering aspects of the
economics of market segmentation by agricultural marketing
institutions as part of her doctoral dissertation under the
supervision of Professor A.C. Zwart. This Research Report
outlines one aspect of this research. It was undertaken in
collaboration with Professor L. Young from the University of
Texas, Austin, Texas, USA. Professor Young derived the
solutions to the problem established in Chapter 3.
R.G. Lattimore
Director
(ii)

1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, marketing institutions operating in
New Zealand's agricultural export sector have placed
increasing emphasis on market segmentation strategies as an
economic instrument. Indications that marketing
institutions have moved towards this type of policy are
evident in attempts to diversify markets, and to gear
promotion activities and product development to specific
market segments. The change in policy emphasis by these
agencies reflects the increasing influence of the
prescriptions of marketing management in agricultural
marketing.
When the general term <market segmentation' is used in
the marketing management context, it tends to refer to the
practices of segmenting a market, targeting specific market
segments, and positioning products within these segments.
Product positioning requires the development of a marketing
mix for each target segment using a particular blend of
controllable marketing variables (Kotler, 1984).
In attempting to apply these principles in the markets
for agricultural products, agencies are faced with the
problem of how much product to allocate to individual market
segments, and what pricing and promotion strategies to adopt
in each of these segments. The prescriptions of economic
theory can assist in these tasks, by indicating optimal
strategies for a particular marketing agency objective. In
the literature, attention has been directed towards this
problem of determining optimal marketing mixes (Lambin,
1976). However, much of it uses extensions tb the theory of
monopolistic or oligopolistic markets, but in typical
2agricultural industries these market conditions do not
apply.
In this Report, the development of economic models of
marketing behaviour are discussed, and the analysis is
extended to consider the specific environment faced by an
agricultural marketing agency. The major feature of such
analysis is the incorporation of a competitive supply
response in a model which determines the optimal pricing and
promotion strategies in more than one market segment.
The following Chapter describes the development of
such models, while Chapter 3 focusses on their extension.
The final Chapter compares the alternative model
prescriptions for pricing and promotion.
3CHAPTER 2
ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND THEIR
OPTIMAL MARKETING STRATEGIES
Since a great deal of attention in the literature has
been directed towards the marketing behaviour of a
monopolistic firm (Lambin, 1976), a generalised version of
this problem will be discussed, and variants and extensions
of this general model will be subsequently examined.
Consider a monopolist who operates in a number of
predetermined market segments, and provides a product of
identical quality to each of these segments. In this case,
demand in the ith market segment, Q., can be written as
1
( 1) Q. = Q.(P., A.)
111 1
where P. and A. are price and advertising, respectively, in
1 1
that segment. Aggregate demand, Q, is then given by
(2) Q = EQ . (P ., A.)
.11 1
1
If the firm maximises profit net of advertising costs,
then its profit function, fi, is
(3) fi = EP.Q.(P., A.) - C(Q) - EA.
.1111 .1
1 1
where C(Q) is the total cost of producing output Q. To
develop appropriate decision rules for marketing mix
optimisation, this objective function, fi, would be
maximised.
4Variants of this generalised problem have been
examined in the literature. For example, Dorfman and
Steiner (1954) considered marketing mix optimisation by a
monopolist in one (aggregate) market, where the decision
variables available to the firm are price or output, and
advertising. In this case, demand, Q, is given by
(4) Q = Q(P,A)
and the profit function, n, by
(5) n = PQ(P,A) ~ C(Q) - A
where P and A are price and advertising.
When this profit function is maximised, it yields the
optimal advertising decision rule
(6) 8 = P - MC13[------]P
where 8 is the advertising to sales ratio, A/(PQ), 13 is the
advertising elasticity of demand, and MC is marginal cost.
The corresponding product-price decision rule is given by
(7) P - MC[------] = II"P
where" is the price elasticity of demand (absolute value).
This is the familiar profit-maximising rule where marginal
cost equals marginal revenue.
These optimal product-price and advertising decision
rules can be expressed in a single relationship which
encapsulates both rules as follows.
(8) 8 = 13/"
5Equation (8) has become known as the Dorfman-Steiner
theorem, and is appropriate for a monopolist operating in a
single market, which includes a marketing agency concerned
with aggregate demand and with the ability to control
output. This theorem of optimal advertising by a monopolist
has been extended to include oligopolistic market structures
(Lambin, 1976), and from its static formulation to include
the dynamics of the sales response to advertising (Nerlove
and Arrow, 1962).
Although the Dorfman-Steiner model considers price,
product and promotion as elements in its marketing mix, it
abstracts from the fourth variable of place, or market
segments. An alternative model which does this, but which
abstracts from promotion, is the familiar model of
monopolistic price discrimination. In this case, demand, Q,
is given by
(9) Q = EQ·(P.)
.11
1
and the profit function, IT by
(10) IT = E P.Q.(P.) - C(Q)
.11 1
1
Maximisation of this profit function gives the
familiar output and pricing rules for a price discriminating
monopolist. That is,
(11) = = = MR.1 = = MC
where MR. is marginal revenue in the ith market and MC is
1
the marginal cost of production.
The decision rules derived from these models give
partial indicators as to how a profit-maximising monopolist
might optimally choose a marketing mix or mixes in specific
6circumstances. However, such prescriptions are not
appropriate for a marketing agency operating in a typically
structured agricultural industry. When operating
collectively on behalf of producers, such institutions may
be able to exert monopoly power in their markets. However,
in New Zealand, they do not have the power to restrict
output by producers. Therefore, when producers receive
higher returns, in the form of a pool price, which results
from demand management strategies in individual market
segments, they may respond by increasing output accordingly.
Unlike the monopoly case, where output is a decision
variable which can be optimised, output is determined
competitively.
Nerlove and Waugh (1961) recognised these supply-side
differences between a monopolist and a typical agricultural
marketing agency. Assuming the above agricultural supply
conditions, they considered the optimal advertising decision
for such agencies operating in one (aggregate) market. In
their model, demand, Q, is given by
(12) Q = Q(P,A)
and supply can be represented by
(13) S = S(P)
where S is the output supplied at price P. The profit
function to be maximised then becomes
(14) IT = PQ(P,A) - C(S(P» - A
where C(S), the aggregate cost of production, is the area
under the supply curve to the left of S. However, this
profit function must be maximised subject to the constraint
that excess supply is zero. That is,
(15) Q(P,A) = S(P)
7The solution to the Nerlove-Waugh model yields the
following advertising decision rule
(16) 8 = --~--
'1 + e
where e is the price elasticity of supply and other
variables are as defined for the Dorfman-Steiner model.
In the Nerlove-Waugh case, the optimal promotion
decision can be deter~ined by the marketing agency, whereas
the product-price decision is determined by the market.
However, like its counterpart, the Dorfman-Steiner theorem,
this model abstracts from the marketing mix variable, place,
since it does not consider pricing and promotion strategies
in individual market segments.
An attempt was made by De Boer (1977) to examine the
direction of advertising effort to individual market
segments under discriminatory pricing between these
segments. However, his prescriptions for agricultural
marketing agencies are not necessarily valid, since he
assumes monopolistic supply features. In fact, the theory
of advertising under competitive agricultural supply
conditions has advanced little since the Nerlove-Waugh
theorem (Strak, 1985).
An obvious extension to the Nerlove-Waugh theorem
would be to consider the allocation of optimal advertising
effort among a number of market segments, where price in
each of these segments is determined by aggregate (total)
demand and supply conditions. This has been done by Martin
(1985).
In this case, demand in market segment i is given by
(17) = Q.(P, A.)
1. 1.
and aggregate demand by
(18) Q = E Q. (P,A.)
. l. l.
l.
8
Supply is represented by
(19) S = S(P)
The profit function to be maximised is given by
(20) II = PEQ.(P,A.) - C(S(P» - EA.
.l. l. .l.
l. l.
subject to the constraint that
(21) EQ. (P, A. ) = S ( P )
• 1. l.
l.
In this case, optimal advertising effort in market
segment i, is given by
(22) e. =
l.
~.
l.
-----
" + e
A.
where e. = l. and ~. is the advertising elasticity of
l. PQ. 1.
l.
demand in market segment i, with all other variables being
defined as for the Nerlove-Waugh model.
In a two market segment case, the relative direction
of advertising effort can be given by the following ratio.
(23) =
That is, the ratio of advertising per unit sales in one
market segment to that in the other market segment is equal
to the ratio of the corresponding advertising elasticities.
9Although the above model extends the Nerlove-Waugh
theorem to consider a number of market segments, it
abstracts from optimal pricing policies which such an
institution might pursue when it has the power to control
the allocation of industry output among alternative market
segments. Consequently, the next Chapter develops a
marketing mix optimisation model which yields decision rules
for optimal pricing and promotion in individual market
segments, and which takes account of typical agricultural
supply features.
In such a case, demand is represented by
(24) Q = EQ • (P ., A.)
.11 1
1
and supply by
(25) S = S(R)
where R is the return per unit of output, or pool price,
received by the producer. This return is given by
(26) R
The profit function to be maximised is
(27) IT = E P. Q. (P., A.) - C(S(R)) - E A.i 1 1 1 1 i 1
where C(S) is defined as for the Nerlove-Waugh model.
As with the Nerlove-Waugh case, the marketing agency
is constrained to adopt policies such that it sells all the
output supplied when producers receive the average return,
R. That is,
(28)
10
E Q.(P., A.) = S(R)i 1. 1. 1.
The solution to this constrained maximisation problem
would yield decision rules for the optimal allocation of
output, and therefore prices, in individual market segments,
and for the optimal allocation of advertising effort to
these segments. However, the aggregate output produced is
determined by market forces.
11
CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
For analytical ease, a two-market segment case of the
generalised model outlined in the previous Chapter will be
considered. To avoid cumbersome mathematical expressions,
some of the notation will also be redefined.
Let d(p,a) be the demand in the first market segment
where the price is p and advertising expenditure isa. The
corresponding variables for the second market segment are
denoted by the corresponding upper case letters. Producers
receive the average return per unit of output, or the pool
price,
(29) r(p,P,a,A)
Let the supply at this pool price be s(r). The aggregate
cost of production of supply, s, is the area, c(s), under
the supply curve to the left of s. The marketing agency
maximises aggregate profits net of advertising costs.
(30) IT(p,P,a,A) pd(p,a) + PD(P,A) - c(d(p,a)
+ D(P,A» - a - A
Let excess supply be
(31) x(p,P,a,A) s(r(p,P,a,A» - d(p,a) - D(P,A)
The marketing agency is constrained to adopt policies such
that it sells all output supplied when producers receive the
pool price, r.
12
Therefore, it solves
(32) mpax A IT(p,P,a,A) subject to x(p,P,a,A) = 0p, ,a,
Let A be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
constraint in (32). Using a subscript to denote partial
differentiation with respect to the corresponding variable,
the Lagrange equations can be written in the form
or
= = = =
(33)
d + (p - c )d
_________!-E
s r - d
r p p
D + (P - cs)Dp
=--------------
srrp - Dp
(P - c)D - 1
s A
-------------srrA - DA
Since c(s) is the area under the supply curve to the
left of s,
(34) c (s(r»
s =
r,
Moreover, recalling the definition (29) of r,
(35)
where
(36)
p - r = p - (pd + PD)/(d + D) = mid
m = (p - P)dD/(d + D)
Note that with this definition
(37) P - r = -miD
13
Using (34) - (37), the first order conditions (33)
simplify to
(38)
or
d + md /d
______12__ =
s r - d
r p p
D - mDp/D
---------
srrp - Dp
mDA/D - 1
= ---------
srrA - DA
(39)
pd + mpd /d
___________ 12 _
srs pr pd d
___r . __ 12 __ 12_
s r d
PD - mPDp/D
= -----------------
srsr Prp PDpD
s r D
-mADA/D - A
= -----------------
srsr ArA ADAD
s r D
=
Define the elasticities
(40) eP =-pd /dj ea =ad /dj t P =pr /rj t a =ar /rj fr =rs /sp a r
with similar definitions for the second market segment using
the corresponding upper case symbols. Then (40) becomes
(41) nd - me
P
_L. _
sfrt p + de P
PD + mE P
= ----------- =
sfrTP + DE P
a
me - a
-----------
sfrt a - ead
-mEA - A
= -----------
sfrTA - EAD
Since
The transmission elasticities are now evaluated.
then
r
Therefore
(42)
Similarly
(43)
Also
r /r =
a
=
=
=
=
=
=
14
pdd + pDd - pdd - QDd
a a a a
----(pd-;-QD)(d-;-D)-----
Dd (p - P)
a(pd-;-PD)(d-;-D)
ar /r
a
Therefore
r /r =p
d(d + D) + pd d + pd D - pd d - PDd
_____________E E E E
(pd + PD)(d + D)
=(44)
Similarly,
15
t P = pr /rp
pd(d + D) + pDd ( p - P)
_______________E _
(pd + PD)(d + D)
= (E~_=_~~~Q{E_=_~llL{~_~_Q) =(pd + PD)
(45) =
=
Prp/r
PD + EPm(p<C+-PD)"
Substituting (21) - (24) into (20) gives
(46) pd - me
P PD + mEP mea - a
(;~-=-~~p);r/;-:-~~p = (;~-:-~p);r/;-:-~;P =mea;r/;-=-~~a =
A
-mE - A
-------------A..r A
-mE I /r - E D
Inverting all expressions in (46)
(47) fr de
P fr DEP frmea dea frmEA DEA
-~ + -------- =-- + -------- =---------- - ------- = ---------- + -------
r p r· P a a A Apd - me PD - mE r(me - a) me - a r(mE + A) ME + A
fr
Subtracting from each term in (47)
r
(48) de
P DEP fra dea -frA DEA
-------- =-------- =---------- - ------- - ---------- + -------
pd - meP PD - mEP r(mea - a) mea - a r(mEA + A) mEA + A
Inverting each expression in (48)
(49) md = =
ame - a
-----------
r a
af /r - de
=
mEA + A
------------
-Afr/r + DE A
16
(49) can be alternatively expressed
(50) md = =
a
a
e
d -
- m
a
a
e
=
A
+ m
EA
-----------
A fr
D - ;A . r:-
Expression (50) gives the first-order conditions in
their final form. Optimal pricing and promotion policies in
both market segments can now be determined by making the
appropriate pairwise comparisons between equations in (50).
Consider the first two equations in (50) and
substitute (35) and (37) into them. This gives
or
(51) =
P + r - P
EP
The left and right hand sides of (51) are simply the
marginal revenues from sales in the first and second market
segments. Equation {51) gives the optimal pricing decisions
in the first and second market and the relationship between
them.
Without loss of generality, assume that, at the
optimum, e P < EP , so that p > P and m > O.
Consider the first and third equations in (50). Since
they are equal
17
(e_ ~) (d afr a- - ---) = - m
e P d a ae r e
e~ r r~e!:__ + maf a- m - = - m
e P a rep rdea ae e
e~ a fre 1 + (e_ ~)=
e P a r e P d
a
e P fr e P frme
+= pd rd - pd .a rd
e P + fr e P (! 1 1 fr m= ------- + - - ---)
rd d P r P rd
e P + fr e P r
= ------- + dr (!: - 1 - !:_te_=_!:2 )rd P P
That is,
or
(52)
a
e
a
a
rd
=
=
e P + fr - eP(l + fr)(l - !:)
_________________________e_
rd
a
e
This equation gives the optimal advertising decision for the
first market segment when an optimal pricing policy is
pursued in that segment.
By a similar comparison of the second and fourth
equations in (50), the corresponding optimal advertising
decision in the second market is given by
(53) A
rD =
18
Note that when a single market is assumed, (52) and (53)
collapse to the Nerlove-Waugh theorem.
The relationship between advertising in the two market
segments can be examined by considering (52) and (53).
Under the convention that e P < EP , which gives P < p, then
P < r < p, and
a
(54) a > erd -------
e P + fr
and
(55) A < E
A
-------
rD EP + fr
Now this implies that
or
a
a
rde
>
1
>
1
-------
EP + fr
>
(56) ~L~AID >
That is, the ratio of advertising per unit sales in the less
price elastic market segment to that in the more price
elastic market segment exceeds the ratio of the
corresponding advertising elasticities.
19
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
In the previous Chapter, optimal pricing and promotion
rules were determined for an agricultural marketing agency
which has control over these marketing variables, but not
over production. These optimal policies will now be briefly
compared with those prescribed by alternative models.
The optimal pricing policy was to set prices in the
two market segments so as to equate the marginal revenue
from selling in each market. That is, a higher price should
be charged in the market segment with the lower price
elasticity. Thus, the conventional rule of the price-
discriminating monopolist for allocating output to market
segments should be maintained, even though the marketing
agency is required to sell all output supplied to it.
However, the marginal revenues in these individual market
segments are not required to equal the marginal cost of
production, and hence, the profit-maximising monopoly level
of output is not produced.
Given optimal pricing, the optimal ratio of
advertising in a market segment to producer returns from
that segment is given by equations (52) and (53). That is,
optimal advertising in a segment is a function of the
advertising and price elasticities of demand in that
segment, the price elasticity of supply, and a measure of
the relationship between the optimal price in that segment
and the pool price returned to suppliers.
Recall the Nerlove-Waugh theorem that a marketing
agency facing a single market should choose policies such
that the ratio of advertising to sales revenue equals the
ratio of the advertising elasticity to the sum of the demand
20
and supply elasticities. By comparison, a price-
discriminating marketing agency should choose advertising
policies such that in the market segment with the lower
(higher) price elasticity of demand, the ratio of
advertising to producer payments should exceed (be less
than) the ratio of the advertising elasticity in that market
to the sum of the demand and supply elasticities in that
market. That is, relatively more (less) advertising effort
(as measured by the advertising to producer returns ratio)
would be directed to the less (more) price elastic market
segment than would be the case if this was the only market
faced by the agency.
Finally, consider relative advertising effort in each
market segment, and recall from inequality (56) that the
ratio of advertising per unit sales in the less price
elastic market to that in the more price elastic market
exceeds the ratio of the corresponding advertising
elasticities. Equation (23) indicates that where pricing is
uniform across market segments and market determined, then
the ratio of advertising per unit sales in one market
segment to that in the other market segment equals the ratio
of the corresponding advertising elasticities. That is,
under optimal pricing, relatively more (less) advertising
effort (as measured by advertising per unit sales) is
directed to the less (more) price elastic market segment
than under uniform pricing across these segments. This
result makes intuitive sense, since relatively more
advertising effort is directed to the less price elastic
segment where the potential to exploit monopoly power
through discriminatory pricing is greater.
21
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